How to avoid paying court filing fees in Louisiana

 To ask for and obtain In Forma Pauperis (IFP) status in Louisiana to avoid paying civil court filing fees, follow these steps: 

1. Determine Eligibility:

Financial Hardship: You must demonstrate to the court that you are unable to afford court costs due to poverty and lack of means. 

Louisiana's Approach: Louisiana courts take a practical view of your finances, considering your income, essential living expenses, and debts. 

2. Prepare Your Application:

Application Form: Obtain and complete the "In Forma Pauperis Affidavit" form, also known as the "Application to Proceed Without Prepaying Fees or Costs." You can find this at the court clerk's office or potentially on the court's website. 

Financial Information: Provide detailed and accurate information about your income, expenses, assets, and debts. Be thorough and honest. 

Supporting Documents: Include documentation to support your financial claims, such as pay stubs, bank statements, tax returns, and proof of government assistance. 

Third-Party Affidavit: Obtain an affidavit from a third party who knows your financial situation and can confirm your inability to pay court costs. 

Notarization: Have both your affidavit and the third-party affidavit signed and notarized. 

3. File Your Application:

Initial Filing: File your IFP application with your initial pleading or lawsuit. 

Later Filing: If you're already involved in a case and can't afford fees, file your IFP application before the fees are due. 

Court Clerk: File the application, supporting documents, and affidavits with the clerk of the court where your case is being heard. 

Keep copies of all documents for your records. 

4. Follow Up with the Court:

Ensure Receipt: Confirm with the court clerk's office that your application has been received and is being processed. 

Check Status: Inquire about the status of your application. 

Court Decision: The judge will review your application and notify you of their decision regarding your IFP status. 

Important Considerations:

Privilege, Not a Right: IFP status is a privilege, not a right, and the judge has discretion to grant or deny it. 

Potential Challenge: Your IFP request can be challenged by the opposing party or the court. 

Responsibility for Costs: If judgment is rendered against you, you will still be responsible for court costs. You can ask the court to waive costs at the end of the proceedings. 

Honesty is Crucial: Provide truthful information in your application and supporting documentation. Falsifying information can lead to serious consequences. 

Disclaimer: This information is intended for general guidance and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult with an attorney to obtain legal advice specific to your situation. 

Surprise Court Fees? What You Need to Know About Filing an Answer in a Debt Lawsuit

 Surprise Court Fees? What You Need to Know 

If you've been sued by a debt collector, you're probably already feeling stressed and overwhelmed. But here’s something that might come as an unwelcome surprise: in some states, just filing your Answer—your official written response to the lawsuit—can cost you money.

Yes, really.

While many states only require the plaintiff (the debt collector) to pay a filing fee when they start the lawsuit, some states also charge the defendant a fee just to respond. And these fees can be steep—over $100 in some jurisdictions. This can feel unfair, especially when you didn’t ask to be dragged into court in the first place.

 Which States Charge Filing Fees for Answers?

The rules vary from state to state, and even county to county. For example:

- In Colorado, filing an Answer can cost $158 or more, depending on whether you include a counterclaim.

- In Louisiana, fees differ by parish: Jefferson Parish charges $25, while St. Bernard Parish adds per-page fees and may also require service fees over $100.

- New Jersey, Maryland, and parts of Massachusetts and Georgia may also charge for Answers, especially if they involve counterclaims or third-party complaints.

On the other hand, some states like Michigan don’t charge anything to file an Answer. Unfortunately, there’s no consistent national rule, and the details are often buried in court websites or local clerk fee schedules.

 Is There Any Way to Avoid Paying the Fee?

Yes—most states that charge fees offer a process for requesting a waiver if you can’t afford to pay.

You may qualify for a fee waiver if:

- You receive public benefits like SNAP (food stamps), Medicaid, SSI, or TANF.

- Your household income is below a certain threshold (often around 125–150% of the Federal Poverty Level).

- You’re experiencing a financial hardship, such as a recent job loss, eviction, or unexpected medical expenses.

To request a waiver, you typically need to fill out a form—often called a “fee waiver” or “in forma pauperis” application—and provide documentation like pay stubs or benefit letters. If the court approves your request, you won’t have to pay the filing fee.

 What Should You Do Next?

1. Check your local court’s website or contact the clerk’s office to find out whether there’s a fee to file an Answer.

2. Ask about a fee waiver if the fee would be a financial burden.

3. Don’t ignore the lawsuit just because of the fee. If you don’t respond in time (usually 20 to 30 days after being served), the court may enter a default judgment against you—which can lead to wage garnishment or other serious consequences.

Bottom line: Filing an Answer to a debt collection lawsuit should never be out of reach just because of a court fee. But the reality is that some places do charge—and it’s up to you to know the rules in your area and ask for a waiver if needed.

If you’re not sure how to proceed, many legal aid organizations offer free assistance or guidance. Don’t let a filing fee stop you from defending your rights.

CASE NOTES - 15 USC 1666i Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA).

Cases that apply or interpret 15 USC 1666i of the Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA).

1. Hasan v. CHASE BANK USA, NA, 880 F. 3d 1217 (10th Circuit 2018)

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17423965640426567968

Hasan is a significant case that directly addresses 15 USC 1666i of the Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA). The Tenth Circuit interpreted the key provision regarding "credit outstanding" in section 1666i.

In this case, Dr. Hasan ordered wine from Premier Cru Fine Wines and paid using his Chase and American Express credit cards. When Premier Cru declared bankruptcy without delivering wine worth nearly $1 million, Hasan sought refunds from both credit card companies under 15 USC 1666i.

The court's key holdings regarding 15 USC 1666i were:

Section 1666i has two parts: 1666i(a) makes credit card issuers "subject to all claims (other than tort claims) and defenses arising out of any transaction in which the credit card is used as a method of payment," but this is explicitly limited by 1666i(b).

Section 1666i(b) limits a cardholder's claims to "the amount of credit outstanding with respect to [the disputed] transaction at the time the cardholder first notifies the card issuer."

The court interpreted "credit outstanding" to mean the amount of credit extended by the card issuer that the cardholder hasn't yet paid back - essentially, whatever balance remains unpaid on the credit card for the disputed transaction.

Since Hasan had paid his credit card bills in full, there was no "credit outstanding" related to the wine purchases, and thus he could recover nothing under 1666i regardless of whether it creates an affirmative right of action.

The court rejected Hasan's argument that "credit outstanding" should be interpreted differently for future delivery transactions, noting that the statute doesn't create different rights for different types of transactions.

 - The most significant recent case on 15 USC 1666i

 - Held that "credit outstanding" in 1666i(b) means "the amount of credit extended by the card issuer that the cardholder hasn't yet paid back" 

 - Ruled that when a consumer has fully paid their credit card balance, there is no "credit outstanding" and thus no claim under 1666i

 - Rejected the consumer's argument that "credit outstanding" should be interpreted differently for future delivery transactions 

Case citations used by the court relating to 15 USC 1666i issues:

Beaumont v. Citibank, No. 01 Civ. 3393(DLC), 2002 WL 483431 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2002) - cited regarding whether 1666i creates an affirmative right of action

The court also cited several general statutory interpretation cases, but Beaumont was the only case directly dealing with section 1666i interpretation.

See: 10th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Fair Credit Billing Act Claims Due to Paid Off Balance - Maurice Wutscher

Tenth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Fair Credit Billing Act Complaint - Shook, Hardy & Bacon

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Other cases that apply or interpret 15 USC 1666i of the Fair Credit Billing Act.

2. Singer v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 890 P.2d 1305 (Nev. 1995)

 - Addressed the geographic limitation in 15 USC 1666i(a)(3)

 - Enforced the statute's 100-mile limit for transactions that occur outside the cardholder's state 

 - Declined to create exceptions to this geographic limitation

3. Moynihan v. Providian Financial Corp., No. JFM-02-2795 (2003 USDC D. Md.)

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/59147913add7b049343f1354

 The court in Moynihan explicitly states that "§ 1666i provides cardholders who meet the criteria of 1666i(a) and who possess a valid non-tort claim or defense against a merchant the right to chargeback certain outstanding amounts by withholding payment." 

 - Interpreted 1666i as not creating an independent cause of action

 - Held that 1666i only allows cardholders to assert claims in three instances: as justification for withholding payment, in lawsuits filed by card issuers to collect, or in connection with TILA violation lawsuits 

 - Concluded that 1666i provides a chargeback right, not an affirmative cause of action

The court explicitly states that "§ 1666i does not create an independent cause of action for a cardholder" but instead only allows cardholders to assert claims against card issuers in three specific instances.

The opinion confirms that § 1666i only permits cardholders to assert claims: "(1) as a justification for withholding payment; (2) in any lawsuit filed by the card issuer to collect on the account; or (3), if appropriate, in connection with a lawsuit brought by the cardholder for a violation of TILA."

The court cites 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c)(1) to support its interpretation that the FCBA provides cardholders "the right to chargeback certain outstanding amounts by withholding payment."

The opinion specifically notes that "Moynihan did not withhold payment. Rather, he filed this suit seeking affirmative relief against Providian," which is precisely why his claim failed.

The court cites Beaumont v. Citibank as being "directly on point" with regard to this interpretation of § 1666i.

4. Beaumont v. Citibank, No. 01 Civ. 3393(DLC), 2002 WL 483431 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2002)

Cause: 28:1331

   - Referenced by the Tenth Circuit in Hasan

   - Found that the FCBA is structured to facilitate withholding of payment by cardholder

   - Determined that if a card issuer sues for payment, a cardholder can use 1666i defensively 

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Baker v. Capital One Bank, Cause: 1:12-cv-00971-SEB-DKL (S.D. IN.  Nov. 26, 2012)

§ 226.12(c) of Regulation Z.  Section 226.12(c) is the implementing regulation for 15 U.S.C. § 1666i, which “allows a cardholder to assert any non-tort claims or defenses arising out of the underlying credit card transaction against a credit card issuer.”  Beaumont v. Citibank (S.D.) N.A., No 01. Civ. 3393(DLC), 2002 WL 483431, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2002).  However, § 1666i does not create an independent cause of action.  Id. at *6-7.  Thus, because Baker has not alleged that Capital One committed any independent violation of the TILA under § 1640(e), her claim fails as a matter of law. 

---------------------------------oOo---------------------------------

These cases collectively establish that 15 USC 1666i:

1. Has a strict limit on claims based on "credit outstanding" at the time of notification

2. Contains geographical limitations (same state or within 100 miles)

3. Is primarily defensive rather than creating an affirmative cause of action

4. Provides no remedy for consumers who have already paid their credit card bills in full

---------------------------------oOo---------------------------------

McGarvey v. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A., 95 Civ. 123, 1995 WL 404866, at *5 (N.D.Ill. 1995).

---------------------------------oOo---------------------------------

FCBA - Fair Credit Billing Act (An amendment to the Truth In Lending Act)

15 U.S. Code § 1666i - Assertion by cardholder against card issuer of claims and defenses arising out of credit card transaction; prerequisites; limitation on amount of claims or defenses

(a)Claims and defenses assertible

Subject to the limitation contained in subsection (b), a card issuer who has issued a credit card to a cardholder pursuant to an open end consumer credit plan shall be subject to all claims (other than tort claims) and defenses arising out of any transaction in which the credit card is used as a method of payment or extension of credit if (1) the obligor has made a good faith attempt to obtain satisfactory resolution of a disagreement or problem relative to the transaction from the person honoring the credit card; (2) the amount of the initial transaction exceeds $50; and (3) the place where the initial transaction occurred was in the same State as the mailing address previously provided by the cardholder or was within 100 miles from such address, except that the limitations set forth in clauses (2) and (3) with respect to an obligor’s right to assert claims and defenses against a card issuer shall not be applicable to any transaction in which the person honoring the credit card (A) is the same person as the card issuer, (B) is controlled by the card issuer, (C) is under direct or indirect common control with the card issuer, (D) is a franchised dealer in the card issuer’s products or services, or (E) has obtained the order for such transaction through a mail solicitation made by or participated in by the card issuer in which the cardholder is solicited to enter into such transaction by using the credit card issued by the card issuer.

(b)Amount of claims and defenses assertible

The amount of claims or defenses asserted by the cardholder may not exceed the amount of credit outstanding with respect to such transaction at the time the cardholder first notifies the card issuer or the person honoring the credit card of such claim or defense. For the purpose of determining the amount of credit outstanding in the preceding sentence, payments and credits to the cardholder’s account are deemed to have been applied, in the order indicated, to the payment of: (1) late charges in the order of their entry to the account; (2) finance charges in order of their entry to the account; and (3) debits to the account other than those set forth above, in the order in which each debit entry to the account was made.

(Pub. L. 90–321, title I, § 170, as added Pub. L. 93–495, title III, § 306, Oct. 28, 1974, 88 Stat. 1515.)

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/1666i

MOYNIHAN v. PROVIDIAN FINANCIAL CORP - 15 U.S.C. § 1666i as affirmative defense to debt collection

 

MOYNIHAN v. PROVIDIAN FINANCIAL CORP

United States District Court, D. Maryland. Jul 14, 2003

JFM-02-2795 (2003 USDC D. Md.)

MEMORANDUM

MOTZ, District Judge

Timothy Moynihan has filed suit against Providian National Bank, N.A. ("Providian"), seeking to recover from Providian a rebate owed him by CyberRebate, a company that is now in bankruptcy. The transaction on which the rebate was due was effected through a credit card issued by Providian, and plaintiff asserts his claim under a provision of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. § 16661. Now pending before me are cross-motions for summary judgment.

For the reasons that follow, I will grant Providian's motion and deny Moynihan's motion.

I.

On May 5, 2001, Moynihan used his Providian-issued credit card to initiate a transaction via the internet with CyberRebate in the amount of $1,449.83. In the transaction, Moynihan purchased ordinary household goods that were sold at inflated prices. CyberRebate represented on its website that it would rebate its customers the full amount of their purchase prices after a period of approximately twelve weeks. Customers did not have to return the products in order to receive the rebates. Moynihan had conducted business with CyberRebate in the past and had successfully received his rebate within the promised time period. Thus, Moynihan expected a rebate in the amount of $1,449.83 within twelve weeks of his purchase.

Approximately a week after Moynihan's transaction with CyberRebate, CyberRebate filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York. Eventually, CyberRebate posted on its website that it was not accepting any returns. Moynihan wrote a letter to CyberRebate on May 17, 2001 requesting that he be allowed to return the merchandise to CyberRebate. (Pl.'s Ex. B.) CyberRebate, however, never responded to the letter.

On June 6, 2001, Providian received a letter from Moynihan informing it of his dispute with CyberRebate. (Def.'s Ex. D.) Providian notified Moynihan on June 20, 2001 that it was in the process of researching his inquiry. (Def.'s Ex. E.) On July 13, 2001, Providian temporarily credited Moynihan's account in the amount of $1449.83 pending final resolution of his dispute. (Def.'s Ex. F.) On January 24, 2002, however, Providian rescinded the credit, stating:

There are no VISA regulations which allow us to charge this amount back to the merchant. A rebate is not a credit card transaction. It is applied for after the purchase and is payable by check. Regulations do not authorize obtaining a rebate via chargeback. You must pursue claims in the merchant's bankruptcy proceedings.

(Def.'s Ex. I.) Moynihan never asserted a claim in CyberRebate's bankruptcy proceedings. Instead, he filed this suit.

II.

Moynihan asserts three claims in his amended complaint: breach of contract, detrimental reliance, and violation of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"). Moynihan does not assert that Providian breached a contract, induced him to rely on its representations, or violated the UCC. Rather, Moynihan argues only that, pursuant to § 1666i, Providian is vicariously liable for any claim he has against CyberRebate.

Section 1666i provides in relevant part:

[A] card issuer who has issued a credit card to a cardholder pursuant to an open end consumer credit plan shall be subject to all claims and defenses arising out of any transaction in which the credit card is used as a method of payment or extension of credit if 

(1) the obligor has made a good faith attempt to obtain a satisfactory resolution of a disagreement or problem relative to the transaction from the person honoring the credit card; 

(2) the amount of the initial transaction exceeds $50 and 

(3) the place where the initial transaction occurred was in the same State as the mailing address previously provided by the cardholder or was within 100 miles from such address.

In arguing for summary judgment, the parties focus on whether Moynihan made a good faith attempt to resolve his disagreement with CyberRebate and whether the transaction occurred within 100 miles of Moynihan's home in Lusby, Maryland. In the end, however, these issues are immaterial because I find that Moynihan's claims fail because § 1666i does not provide an independent cause of action and he has not properly alleged a "billing error" as required under 15 U.S.C. § 1666.

Beaumont v. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A., 01 Civ. 3393 (DLC), 2002 WL 483431 (S.D.N.Y. March 28, 2002), is directly on point. There, the court explained that § 1666i creates a structure under which the burden of bringing a lawsuit to collect a debt, after the cardholder has attempted and failed to obtain satisfactory resolution of a dispute, is placed on the card issuer, rather than the cardholder. Id. at *6. Section 16661, however, "does not create an independent cause of action for a cardholder." Id. Rather, § 16661 only allows a cardholder to assert claims and defenses against a card issuer in three instances: (1) as a justification for withholding payment; (2) in any lawsuit filed by the card issuer to collect on the account; or (3), if appropriate, in connection with a lawsuit brought by the cardholder for a violation of TILA. Id. at *5-6.1. A cardholder may not assert affirmative claims and defenses authorized under § 1666i unless he or she can also assert a claim for a violation of TILA. Id. at *6. Absent such a violation, § 16661 only allows a cardholder to "assert" a claim or defense to payment on the underlying transaction with the merchant against the card issuer "by withholding payment on the credit card account up to the amount of credit outstanding for the property or services that gave rise to the dispute, plus any finance or other charge imposed on that amount." Id.; 20 Am. Jur.2d, Credit Cards Charge Accounts § 62 (2001); see also McGarvey v. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A., 95 Civ. 123, 1995 WL 404866, at *5 (N.D.Ill. 1995).

This reading of § 1666i is fully supported by the regulation which implements it. That regulation provides:

When a person who honors a credit card fails to resolve satisfactorily a dispute as to property or services purchased with the credit card in a consumer credit transaction, the cardholder may assert against the card issuer all other claims (other than tort claims) and defenses arising out of the transaction and relating to the failure to resolve the dispute. The cardholder may withhold payment up to the amount of credit outstanding for the property or services that gave rise to the dispute and any finance or other charges imposed on that amount.

12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c)(1) (emphasis added).

In short, § 16661 provides cardholders who meet the criteria of 1666i(a) and who possess a valid non-tort claim or defense against a merchant the right to chargeback certain outstanding amounts by withholding payment. Beaumont, 2002 WL 483431, at *6; see also In re Standard Financial Mgmt. Corp., 94 B.R. 231, 237-38 (D. Mass. 1988). If the card issuer disputes the cardholder's claim or defense against the merchant or the cardholder's satisfaction of the 1666i(a) criteria, it must bring suit to recover the disputed amounts from the cardholder. Beaumont, 2002 WL 483431, at *6; see also 20 Am. Jur.2d, Credit Cards Charge Accounts § 62 (2001) ("[T]he agreement between the cardholder and the issuing bank sets off a train of events, so that if the cardholder has a right to charge back against the issuing bank, then that bank has a right against the merchant's bank, who has a right against the merchant.").2

If "the cardholder withholds payment of the amount of credit outstanding for the disputed transaction, the card issuer shall not report that amount as delinquent until the dispute is settled or judgment is rendered." 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c)(2). Thus, the cardholder is not penalized for withholding payment. The process set forth in § 1666i makes sense in light of the purpose of TILA, which is:

to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices.

15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (emphasis added).

Moynihan did not withhold payment. Rather, he filed this suit seeking affirmative relief against Providian. Thus, the only remaining issue is whether Moynihan has properly alleged a violation of TILA. Moynihan alleges that pursuant to § 1666, "the charges placed on the plaintiff's account by Cyberrebate.com are `billing errors' because the expected service, i.e., transmission of the rebate, was never received as promised." (Am. Compl. ¶ 7.) However, this allegation, if proved, would not establish a "billing error" under TILA. TILA defines billing errors as:

(1) A reflection on a statement of an extension of credit which was not made to the obligor or, if made, was not in the amount reflected on such statement.

(2) A reflection on a statement of an extension of credit for which the obligor requests additional clarification including documentary evidence thereof.

(3) A reflection on a statement of goods or services not accepted by the obligor or his designee or not delivered to the obligor or his designee in accordance with the agreement made at the time of the transaction.

(4) A creditor's failure to reflect properly on a statement a payment made by the obligor or a credit issued to the obligor.

(5) A computation error or similar error of an accounting nature of the creditor on a statement.

(6) Failure to transmit the statement required under section 1637(b) of this title to the last address of the obligor which has been disclosed to the creditor, unless that address was furnished less than twenty days before the end of the billing cycle for which the statement is required.

(7) Any other error described in regulations of the Board.

15 U.S.C. § 1666(b) (emphasis added); see also Beaumont, 2002 WL 483431, at *3-4.

Moynihan has alleged no facts or presented any evidence showing a "billing error." He merely attempts to hold Providian vicariously liable for CyberRebate's failure to provide him with a rebate. His claim therefore fails as a matter of law.

A separate order is being entered herewith.

ORDER

For the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum, it is, this 14th day of July

2003

ORDERED that

1. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted;

2. Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment is denied;

3. Judgment is entered in favor of defendant against plaintiff; and

4. This case is closed.

What happens when you stop making monthly minimum payments on your credit card?

When a credit card holder stops making the minimum payment, late fees do continue to accumulate each month, but that's just one part of what happens. Here's what typically occurs:

Late fees are charged each month you miss a payment (usually $25-$40 per missed payment, depending on your card agreement)

The account enters delinquency status, which progresses through stages:

30 days late

60 days late

90 days late

120+ days late

The interest rate often increases to a higher penalty APR (which can be 29.99% or higher)

Credit reporting begins, with increasingly severe negative marks appearing on your credit report as the delinquency continues

After approximately 180 days (6 months) of non-payment, the account is typically "charged off" by the credit card company, meaning:

They write it off as a loss for accounting purposes

The account is closed/terminated

The debt is either sold to a collection agency or pursued through their own collection department

Even after charge-off, you still legally owe the debt, and interest and fees may continue to accrue according to the original card agreement. The debt can remain collectible for several years (the statute of limitations varies by state, typically 3-10 years).

If you're having trouble making payments, it's usually better to contact your credit card company directly to discuss hardship programs or payment arrangements rather than simply stopping payments.

FDCPA Notice of Debt and Itemization Date

 FDCPA Notice of Debt and Itemization Date

§ 809 Notice of Debt

15 U.S.C. § 1692g

Debt Validation 

Debt collectors and others commonly refer to the validation requirements in FDCPA section 809(a) as a “validation notice” or a “G notice.”

(a) Notice of debt; contents

Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing-

(1) the amount of the debt;

(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;

(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector;

(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and

(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.

(b) Disputed debts

If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a) that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor, and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector. Collection activities and communications that do not otherwise violate this subchapter may continue during the 30-day period referred to in subsection (a) unless the consumer has notified the debt collector in writing that the debt, or any portion of the debt, is disputed or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor. Any collection activities and communication during the 30-day period may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer's right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original creditor.

(c) Admission of liability

The failure of a consumer to dispute the validity of a debt under this section may not be construed by any court as an admission of liability by the consumer.

(d) Legal pleadings

A communication in the form of a formal pleading in a civil action shall not be treated as an initial communication for purposes of subsection (a).

(e) Notice provisions

The sending or delivery of any form or notice which does not relate to the collection of a debt and is expressly required by title 26, title V of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act [ 15 U.S.C. 6801 et seq.], or any provision of Federal or State law relating to notice of data security breach or privacy, or any regulation prescribed under any such provision of law, shall not be treated as an initial communication in connection with debt collection for purposes of this section.

—----------------------

Debt Collection Rule

Small Entity Compliance Guide

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_debt-collection_small-entity-compliance-guide.pdf

Itemization-related information

A debt collector must include a breakdown of the debt, which includes the following items: Itemization date. 12 CFR 1006.34(b)(3). A debt collector must disclose the date that it will use when disclosing the itemization-related information. The “itemization date” reflects an event in the debt’s history that provides a reference point that consumers may recognize. Debt collectors may determine the itemization date, which will be used to identify other itemization-related items (as well as the name of the creditor as of the itemization date and the account number disclosures, discussed above in the debt information section), by selecting one of five reference dates:

1. The last statement date. The last statement date is the date of the last periodic statement or written account statement, or invoice provided to the consumer by a creditor. The last statement may have been provided by a creditor or a third party acting on the creditor’s behalf, including a creditor’s service provider. However, a statement or invoice provided by a debt collector is not a last statement, unless the debt collector is also a creditor. 12 CFR 1006.34(b)(3)(i); Comment 1006.34(b)(3)(i)-1

2. The charge-off date. The charge-off date is the date the debt was charged off. 12 CFR 1006.34(b)(3)(ii).

3. The last payment date. The last payment date is the last date a payment was applied to the debt. It can be the date a third-party payment was applied to the debt, such as a payment from an auto repossession agent or an insurance company, if that payment was the last payment on the account. 12 CFR 1006.34(b)(3)(iii); Comment 1006.34(b)(3)(iii)-1.

4. The transaction date. The transaction date is the date of the transaction that gave rise to the debt. It is the date that the good or service that gave rise to the debt was provided or made available to the consumer. For example, the transaction date for a debt arising from a medical procedure may be the date the medical procedure was performed, and the transaction date for a consumer’s gym membership may be the date the membership contract was executed. In some cases, a debt may have more than one transaction date. If a debt has more than one transaction date, a debt collector may use any of the transaction dates as the transaction date for purposes of the itemization date. For example, if a consumer enters into a contract on one date and the creditor performs the contracted service on another date, either date may be the transaction date. However, the debt collector must use the selected transaction date consistently. 12 CFR 1006.34(b)(3)(iv); Comment 1006.34(b)(3)(iv)-1. 

5. The judgment date. The judgment date is the date of a final court judgment that determines the amount of the debt owed by the consumer. 12 CFR 1006.34(b)(3)(v).

12 CFR 1006.34(c)(2)(vi); 12 CFR 1006.34(b)(3).

For any of the five itemization reference date options above, once a debt collector uses one of these dates in any communication with a consumer for a debt, the debt collector must use that date consistently in validation information communications about that debt to that consumer. For example, the debt collector may not use the last statement date for some items and the charge-off date for other items disclosed in the validation information. In that scenario, the debt collector must exclusively use either the last statement date or the charge-off date for all itemization-related validation information for that debt. Comment 1006.34(b)(3)-1. However, a subsequent debt collector need not use the same itemization date as prior debt collectors. Comment 1006.34(b)(3)-2.

 

Florida Criminal Background Checks

March, 2025

Thomas Fox, J.D.

Fox Paralegal Services

Lake Cumberland, Kentucky

https://blog.foxparalegalservices.com/

Florida Youth Soccer has, by law, begun to require Level 2 Florida criminal background checks. The Lovel 2 criminal background check requires the applicant's fingerprints. This makes the Level 2 check more rigorous than the Level 1 background check, that does not involve he use of fingerprints.

How much more accurate and in-depth is the Level 2 criminal background check compared to the Level 1 check, and why? 

Comparison: Level 2 vs. Level 1 Criminal Background Checks in Florida

Florida law distinguishes between Level 1 and Level 2 background checks, with Level 2 being significantly more rigorous, in-depth, and accurate. The key differences arise from the use of fingerprints, the breadth of criminal record searches, and how deeply the subject is vetted.

Florida Youth Soccer Association

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1. Key Differences Between Level 1 and Level 2 Background Checks

Feature	Level 1 Background Check	Level 2 Background Check
Identification Method	Name-based (SSN, DOB, Name)	Fingerprint-based (more precise)
Scope of Criminal Record Search	Florida-only (FDLE database)	Statewide + National (FBI/FDLE)
FBI National Check	❌ Not included	✅ Includes FBI fingerprint check
Accuracy & Risk of Errors	Higher risk of false matches (common names, aliases)	Extremely precise due to biometric verification
Arrest & Conviction Records	May only report convictions	Reports arrests, charges, and convictions
Search of Additional Databases	Limited to FDLE databases	Includes NCIC, sex offender registries, abuse registries
Who Typically Requires It?	Private employers, lower-risk roles	Jobs with vulnerable populations (youth, elderly, disabled)
Disqualifying Offenses	Employer discretion	Florida Statutes § 435.04 defines automatic disqualifications

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2. Why Is Level 2 More Accurate and In-Depth?

A. Fingerprints Ensure Correct Identification

• Level 1 relies on name-based searches, which can miss records due to alias use, misspellings, or common names.

• Level 2 uses fingerprints, which are unique to each person, eliminating identity confusion.

• Example: Two "John Smiths" in Florida—Level 1 may confuse their records, but Level 2 fingerprints confirm exact matches.

B. Nationwide Criminal Record Check

• Level 1 checks only Florida records (FDLE system), missing crimes from other states.

• Level 2 searches the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and other state law enforcement databases, ensuring out-of-state crimes are not overlooked.

C. More Comprehensive Background Coverage

• Level 2 includes records of arrests, charges, and convictions, whereas Level 1 often reports only convictions.

• Sex offender registries and child abuse databases are included in Level 2, ensuring maximum safety for positions working with minors.

D. Florida Statute § 435.04 Mandates Strict Disqualifications

• Level 2 disqualifies individuals automatically for certain offenses, such as:

• Sexual offenses

• Child abuse

• Violent felonies

• Fraud-related felonies

• Level 1 does not have mandatory disqualifications—employers have more discretion.

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3. Why Is Level 2 Necessary for Youth Athletic Coaches?

• Ensures child safety by detecting past crimes nationwide.

• Reduces risk of mistaken identity by using fingerprints.

• Aligns with Florida law (statute mandates fingerprint-based screenings for positions of trust).

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Final Verdict: How Much More Accurate Is Level 2?

• Level 2 is vastly more accurate because it: ✅ Uses biometric fingerprinting for precise identification.

• Searches national databases (FBI, NCIC, sex offender registries), unlike Level 1, which is limited to Florida records.

• Detects arrests, pending charges, and convictions, whereas Level 1 may only show convictions.
  Prevents identity mix-ups, a common issue in name-based searches.

Conclusion:

 Level 2 background checks are the gold standard for positions requiring a high degree of trust, like youth athletic coaching, because they provide the most thorough vetting possible.

Additional Resources:

FYSA Risk Management Policy Memo

Florida Youth Soccer Association RULES  2024 - 2025 

The FYSA Risk Management Program is in place to identify and assess potential risks to their soccer community. FYSA monitors and minimizes the probability and/or impact these risks may pose to youth athletes around the state.